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CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: AN




Hell is paved with good intentions.'
Whether American business is or should be "socially re-
sponsible" is a question that has received some attention
from economists for quite a long time. The issue has gained
currency in recent years in light of such unhappy events as
the risky positioning of gas tanks in Ford Pinto automobiles,
the prevalence of pulmonary disease among long-term asbes-
tos workers, and the Bhopal tragedy. The purpose of this
brief essay is to point out that what may appear the obvious
ethical response to questions about the desirability of corpo-
rate social responsibility is far from obvious to economists. By
a somewhat similar token, the "cold hearted" economic re-
sponse to such questions may, upon reflection, turn out to be
appropriate.
The Morality of the Marketplace
To assess the argument that corporate responsibility is a
useful check on the undesirable results of unfettered markets
requires an understanding of what we mean by "good" eco-
nomic performance, and how "good" behavior by individual
managers contributes to it. In other words, we want to be
able to make evaluative, or normative, statements about what
constitutes appropriate behavior of managers, and then see
under what conditions such "good behavior," in the context
of freely functioning markets, will lead to "good" economic
performance.
At the level of the individual manager, one might say
that good behavior is that which conforms to the accepted
moral standards of society. Such behavior goes beyond simply
obeying the law, and addresses the many situations of moral
* Professor of Economics, Rutgers University.
** Professor of Economics, Drew University.
1. J. RAY, ENGLISH PROVERBS (1670).
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conflict which all individuals are called upon to resolve in the
course of everyday life.
How each person deals with such problems depends not
only on the values she has learned, but on the institutional
environment in which she finds herself. Thus one might ex-
pect an individual working for a large corporation with a dis-
tinct managerial hierarchy to resolve a conflict between two
employees differently than would an individual working in a
university with its rather more fluid structure. Moreover, the
nature of the moral dilemma is likely to be different for dif-
ferent institutions. The manager of a chemical company may
face a decision about whether to undertake the development
of a new product for which waste byproducts have unknown
but suspected toxic qualities, whereas a physician may have to
decide whether or not to remove a patient from life support
systems. Nevertheless, in spite of the differences between in-
stitutions, and in spite of the fact that it is clearly possible for
equally responsible individuals to disagree over the appropri-
ate course of action, there is, as Peter Drucker has argued,
no reason to suggest that business managers should or do
conform to radically different standards of behavior than an-
yone else.' Society expects all its members to approach the
problems of the workplace with integrity and to eschew im-
moral behavior in all spheres of activity.
Even if everyone in a market-oriented society (and busi-
ness managers in particular) were to behave impeccably well,
the question remains whether such behavior would result in
"desirable" economic performance.' This question opens a
Pandora's box whose contents are addressed by a vast eco-
nomic and philosophical literature." Several issues
predominate. One is the definition of "good" or "desirable"
economic performance, a matter that is usually discussed in
2. Drucker, What is "business ethics"?, 63 PUB. INTEREST 18 (1981).
3. Oliver E. Williamson identifies three types of self-interest seeking
behavior in contractual relationships: opportunism, which refers to self-in-
terest seeking with guile; simple self-interest seeking, in which the individ-
ual fully discloses her self-interest; and finally obedience, in which the indi-
vidual subordinates her self-interest. Williamson argues that obedience is
an inappropriate form of activity in the economic sphere, and that while
simple self-interest seeking is the basis for neo-classical economic theory,
the prevalence of opportunistic behavior should make such behavior an el-
ement to be considered in the development of institutions. 0. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTION OF CAPITALISM 43-63 (1985).
4. Amartya Sen is one of the major contributors to this literature.
See generally Sen, The Moral Standing of the Market, in ETHICS AND ECONOM-
ics 1-19 (E.F. Paul, J. Paul, and F.D. Miller eds. 1985).
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terms of justice in the distribution of society's income and ef-
ficiency in the allocation of scarce resources.5 A second major
issue is the role of individual rights and entitlements in eco-
nomic processes, as opposed to the fairness of the distribu-
tional outcome. A third issue is the role of government as a
protector of rights or a guarantor of "good" market per-
formance, or both.
The historic connections between markets, justice, and
efficiency are well known. Modern inheritors of the ideas of
Adam Smith,6 John Locke,7 and the Utilitarians8 now tend to
fall into two camps. Followers of the libertarian philosopher
Robert Nozick9 argue that markets, and only markets, pro-
tect fundamental moral rights. Those who follow the philoso-
pher John Rawls1" believe that individual rights can be un-
derstood only in the context of a just social constitution that
would be agreed to by moral individuals ignorant of their ul-
timate position in the social order. Such a constitution would
weight most heavily the interests of the most disadvantaged
members of society; the market is manifestly an inadequate
protector in the Rawlsian view.
American economists, while harboring some pro-market
sentiments, do not usually go so far as Nozick." They are
nevertheless accused with some frequency of wholly uncriti-
cal acceptance of market outcomes.
Without exploring the philosophical or economic under-
pinnings in great depth, it should suffice to note that,
whatever one's personal beliefs, almost all socie-
ties-including the most vigorously individualistic-have
chosen to intervene pervasively in the marketplace. There
are all sorts of market results-ranging from the distribution
of income to the quantity of air pollution to the menu of
5. Justice and efficiency, however, are intertwined to the extent that
an independent definition of each may prove impossible.
6. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
7. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, (1690).
8. Modern utilitarianism springs from the work of John Stuart Mill,
e.g., UTILITARIANISM (186 1), and Jeremy Bentham, THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM (1837). See generally UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (A. Sen and B.
Williams eds. 1982).
9. R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA, (1974).
10. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
11. This is true even of "Chicago School" enthusiasts. Milton Fried-
man, for example, is about as vigorous a defender of the free market as
American economics has produced. Yet even he concedes a need for collec-
tive (governmental) intervention, although within very narrow limits to be
sure. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
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safety devices on our automobiles-that we alter via govern-
ment mandate. Unless one contends that political/legal
choices in these matters have been massively distorted, the
judgment has already been rendered: markets do indeed pro-
duce some outcomes that society considers unacceptable.
Corporate Social Responsibility: Pro and Con
Once the reality of undesirable market outcomes is ac-
knowledged, the argument for corporate responsibility may
appear self-evident. Many business decisions carry the poten-
tial for enormous social good or ill, perhaps more so now
than in times past. Who could possibly hope that our captains
of industry would ignore the commonweal in narrow-minded
pursuit of the "bottom line?" Surely it is preferable that com-
panies build safer rather than more dangerous cars, limit
their air pollution, and avoid committing environmental
atrocities. If corporate managements are willing to do these
things in the name of a broadly construed social interest, will
anyone-save perhaps Milton Friedman-really object? 2
It turns out that the "self evident" proposition is not re-
ally obvious. There are, in fact, at least two fundamental diffi-
culties with the idea that corporate social responsibility will
solve the problems associated with the market system. The
first difficulty has to do with "externalities"'" or third-party
effects; the second with the accountability of public as com-
pared with private institutions.
Consider the management of a pollution-creating factory
that aspires to corporate statesmanship, and suppose that no
anti-pollution laws exist. What is the "responsible" course of
action for this management? Should the company voluntarily
reduce its pollution? By a "little bit?" By a "moderate"
12. Consider Friedman's well-known statement: "Few trends could so
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the ac-
ceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make
as much money for their stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally
subversive doctrine." Id., at 133.
13. "Externalities" refers to the frequently unpleasant, or even dan-
gerous, impact of activities upon nonparticipants: for example, the cost im-
posed by a chemical manufacturer's pollution upon nearby residents who
neither work for nor purchase the products of the company.
The increased importance of pollution in a nation such as the United
States is tied to the growth of income and to population density. In a fron-
tier society, how one disposed of one's garbage was a matter of no concern
to (distant) neighbors. In a modern urban setting there is a great deal more
garbage and one's neighbors are both close and numerous.
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amount? By enough to drive the firm out of business? This
last alternative points out a fundamental reality. Pollution
abatement is costly in two ways. To install the necessary
equipment must raise both production costs and product
prices (if it were not costly in this sense, even the non-respon-
sible firm would install it). But if the added cost forces the
firm to reduce its output-in the extreme, to leave the mar-
ket-then consumers lose access to the goods produced by
the polluter: automobiles, heat and electricity, convenient
food packages, and medicaments to ease our discomforts,
among them. What, then, is the "responsible" choice of such
a company's management?
The hard fact is that even if the polluting firm volunta-
rily reduces its activities, its own restrictions will have a negli-
gible effect on the environment unless other firms follow suit.
If they do not follow suit, moreover, our "responsible" man-
agement will also have damaged its competitive position in
the bargain. Hence, there is absolutely no incentive for a firm
to reduce its pollution in the absence of a law. Quite the con-
trary, any company that acts "irresponsibly" will benefit if all
other firms are "well behaved."
This is precisely the scenario that illustrates the impo-
tence of the market in dealing with environmental degrada-
tion. Markets do not do an effective job of providing a "pub-
lic good" such as pollution control. And, when appropriate
resources are not allocated to such tasks, the case for laws
that require all firms to shoulder the burden is clear-cut.
A major task of the market, its raison d'etre, is precisely
the balancing of the myriad costs and benefits that every eco-
nomic activity creates. The central virtue of competitive mar-
kets is that they allocate resources efficiently, meaning that
resources flow to the uses in which they are valued most
highly."' When the market fails, as in the case of pollution
control, various forms of government intervention can in
principle correct the failure by requiring appropriate action.
By contrast, exhortations to corporate management to "act
responsibly" convey not the slightest guidance about how to
proceed.1 5 Once antipollution laws are in place, society ex-
14. The equivalent Pareto notion of efficiency is a situation in which
the welfare of one or more members of society can be improved only by
harming the welfare of another or others. Economists have long demon-
strated that a system of perfectly competitive markets implies such "Pareto
optimality".
15. Milton Friedman has asked: "If businessmen do have a social re-
sponsibility other than making maximum profits for stockholders, how are
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pects from business managers the same integrity in compli-
ance as it does from businesses and individuals in, say, paying
income taxes.
The second objection to reliance on corporate con-
science is at least equally compelling. Let us suppose that our
polluting firm's management can somehow define what it
means by a socially responsible policy, and limits its activities
accordingly. Is this an ethically satisfactory result? The an-
swer would seem to be no, although it may not be the worst
conceivable result.
Air pollution presents serious and complex societal
problems, the "appropriate" treatment of which is often not
obvious. The best we can strive for in these circumstances
may well be reasonable procedures for seeking appropriate,
nonobvious resolutions. Here our options are limited. The
most effective solution mechanism is ordinarily the market,
but markets do not deal well with pollution problems because
of the heavy external component in pollution costs.
If we abandon the market, at least partially, the choices
that remain are: the government agency and the corporate
conscience. The problems that accompany government regu-
lation are both familiar and real."' Public agencies have one
critical virtue, however: they are accountable to the public,
even though the accounting system tends to work
imperfectly.
We ordinarily permit private executives to make our
economizing decisions because we believe that these decisions
are appropriately controlled by the market. Where market
discipline is eroded, as in the pollution case, an alternative
type of control-governmental-is appropriately substituted.
In either event, society holds sway. Unacceptable economic
they to know what it is?" M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 133.
In a similar vein, Ben W. Lewis, an economist with very different views
from Friedman's, has observed: "[corporate conscience] may assure us that
the men who make the decisions will be well intentioned and good, but it
tells neither them nor us anything about the shape of goodness; it tells no
one what society wants done and, hence, what to do." Lewis, Power Blocs
and the Operation of Economic Forces: Economics by Admonition, 49 AM. EcoN.
REV. 384, 395-96 (1959).
16. These range from specific distortions in the use of factors of pro-
duction, such as in the overinvestment in capital that is termed the Averch-
Johnson effect, see Averch and Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under Regula-
tory Control, 52 AM. EcoN. REV. 1053 (1962), to the possibility that captured
regulators will act as a cartel to advance the interests of the "regulated"
firms, see e.g., Stigler, The theory of economic regulation, 2 BELL J. or ECON. &
MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
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choices will be penalized, either by market forces or by public
agency regulators.
To rely to any important extent on managerial discretion
(corporate conscience) when the market breaks down, seems
an odd way to go. Society has, by assumption, lost market-
type control over its choices; yet no other mechanism to en-
force social accountability is in place. This is an inauspicious
scenario, even though our business leaders may be well inten-
tioned and capable.
The pollution example that we have been discussing rep-
resents a clear market failure; the chemical manufacturer, ig-
noring the external costs of its activities, produces a result
that is "incorrect" in terms of efficiency. It is quite apparent,
however, that even a properly functioning (efficient) market
can yield arguably unethical outcomes.
Consider a company whose product occasionally injures
its users, and suppose that it is technically possible to make
the product safer. The company's decision not to increase its
product's safety is, by assumption, efficient: to make a safer
product would be so costly that it would outweigh any con-
ceivable gains (such as improved reputation and fewer law-
suits by injured consumers).
Would a "socially responsible" management move to im-
prove product safety? Once again, the answer is not obvious.
Greater safety is good but costly, and we have assumed that
the costs in this instance outweigh the gains. One might de-
cide that additional safety is the "responsible" course, but the
criterion for this decision is obscure. Surely there is no gen-
eral basis for arguing that morality requires the expenditure
of any quantity of resources, however large, in order to ob-
tain any increment in safety, however small.
At a more mundane level, the management that decides
to pursue additional safety incurs potentially heavy penalties.
Since the extra safety increases costs (by more than compen-
satory benefits), a reasonably efficient market will not reward
such statesmanlike conduct. Indeed, in a vigorously competi-
tive environment, the highly responsible firm might not
survive.1"
We thus see precisely the same difficulties with social re-
sponsibility in an efficient market setting as in the market fail-
17. Even if the firm's market is not highly competitive, there may
exist an efficient market in "corporate control." If so, the company that
acts "responsibly," thereby reducing its profits, is likely to become a target
for takeover by a more traditional, profit-oriented group.
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ure case: the meaning of responsible behavior is unclear, and
if only one company acts responsibly (having managed to de-
fine what responsibly means) it suffers a competitive disad-
vantage. Moreover, if the "responsible," competitively disad-
vantaged firm is able to survive, society may yet be ill served.
For we are then subject to the non-accountable whims of a
corporate leadership that has somehow managed to decide
for us what is to be considered "responsible" behavior.
Conclusion
Corporate responsibility, like motherhood, is a difficult
thing to criticize, and we should no doubt hope that if our
business managers possess broad discretion to affect society
they will exercise this power benevolently. The real question
is whether we should rely on such judgment in lieu of gov-
ernment intervention. In both economic and ethical terms,
the answer is no.
Lee Iacocca is an estimable gentleman, but we do not
want him deciding what amount of smoke in the air is best
for us-at least not unless and until he is elected to public
office. This should be our decision and our neighbors' deci-
sion; or, if the market does not permit that, then the decision
of someone who is accountable to all of us. Social responsibil-
ity is a desirable personal trait, not only in a business execu-
tive but in all citizens (this statement is an uninteresting
truisml). Social responsibility is not, however, a rational
mechanism for important social and economic choices in a
democratic society.
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